This article explores the implications of 'business for peace' (B4P), a new global governance paradigm that aims to put international businesses at the frontline of peace, stability and development efforts in fragile and conflict-affected states. This article argues that B4P entails a shift in the balance between public and private authority across what we coin the 'business-peace nexus' and which comprises corporate peacebuilding activities across different spatial scales and institutional settings.
Situating B4P in international relations and global governance
The role of multinational corporations (MNCs) While multilateral institutions like the United Nations and the World Bank are promising that business stakeholders are 'the way forward' for peacebuilding, International Relations (IR) scholarship has remained relatively silent. As B4P encroaches upon domains that are typically theorised as the preserve of states, we aim to situate B4P and the broader business-peace thrust within current debates on the role of MNCs iii in IR and global governance. Given the strong traditional association between peacebuilding and public authority on the one hand, and the widespread controversy around the impact of business in fragile and/or conflict-affected settings on the other hand, how does this emergent new paradigm reshape the balance between public and private authority in global governance? Beyond the legitimate concerns raised by the wisdom of making MNCs peacebuilders, we argue that it contains the seeds of a more substantial paradigm shift in global peacebuilding and development architectures, and by reframing corporations as peace actors, B4P
also influences foundational controversies in global governance. The global politics of peacebuilding not only pertains to the sovereign praxis of deploying peace agents, but is also about defining who is a legitimate actor in this field of activity. Likewise, business-peace interactions can constitute a wide array of activities, from efforts to address 'root causes' of conflict, involvement in peace processes, development projects or even security and infrastructure construction. The expansion of the mandate of foreign business actors in vulnerable countries to also include development activities strikes upon core IR debates regarding relationships between states and companies through lenses of both politics and economics -positions that are as powerful as they are contested.
The premise of this article is that B4P analysis can provide new insights into some of the most intractable and urgent questions of international politics by exploring directly how the public and the private now intersect within a field of practice long associated with state sovereignty in global governance (cf. Abrahamsen and Williams 2014) . In 2002, Rodney Hall and Thomas Biersteker (2002) noted the 'emergence of private authority in global governance' in an eponymous volume. In foregrounding the negative effects of a bigger role for private actors in global governance, the subsequent literature has sometimes conceptualised the ascent of private actors in international politics as a one-way street, in which private actors garner unaccountable and unwanted power in a sphere of global governance hitherto public (i.e. Leander 2005; Small 2006 ).
In situating B4P within broader transformations of the relationship between public and private authority in peacebuilding, we signal the emergence of what we call the business-peace nexus, iv which houses the many entanglements between two fields of practice that are usually considered distinct: formal private-sector profit-seeking and peacebuilding activities. We echo the conceptual development of the 'security-development nexus' (cf. Stern and Öjendal 2010) in order to explore analytically the distribution of authority at specific interfaces of public and private actors across the many scalar, spatial and institutional settings where peacebuilding gets shaped. Criticism of the security-development nexus emerged in response to the incorporation of development aid into security strategies of post-Cold War (and in particular post-9/11) interventions in conflict-affected and high-risk environments. As these same areas are now the focal point of B4P interventions, critiques on the merger of security and development logics as strongly echoing late colonial practice hold particular import (Duffield 2007) . Additional studies used the analytical purchase of the notion of the nexus to demonstrate how deep linkages across the domains of development and security were concerted attempts to create coherence at the level of transnational governance (Stepputat 2012 ) even as they led to contradictory effects on the ground.
In blurring the boundary between 'security' and 'development' politics, military means and logics usually associated with warfare are now found in development aid (Bachmann et al. 2015) .
We explore the business-peace nexus accordingly by investigating the redistribution of authority at, and their co-production across, different sites and scales, expanding studies of the tensions arising from global private security governance (Abrahamsen and Williams 2011) . Informed by a burgeoning literature on that topic, the distribution of authorship at the interface of business and peace can take many shapes, concerning not only the capacity to 'steer' or set discursive agendas in global governance, but also comprising the 'rowing' or the exercise of authority through practical decisionmaking at the level of implementation (cf. Hall and Biersteker 2002: 4) .
In this article, we explore B4P's influence upon the balance between public and private authority in global governance by highlighting two nodes within the business-peace nexus: B4P's role in global peacebuilding architectures; and the sociology of local governance in fragile and conflict-affected areas. We first situate the emergence of the B4P philosophy as a significant step in the reconfiguration of the public/private divide in global governance. We then illustrate how the 6 framing of B4P within corporate governance has led to a restructuring of the public and private in conflict zones with significant corporate activity. We then explore the business-peace nexus in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to show that if B4P can successfully embed MNCs into public accountability structures at the global level, locally the reverse can occur: by legitimising MNCs as peace actors, the B4P framework risks being co-opted in the institutionalisation and radicalisation of asymmetrical encounters between MNCs and the people affected by their operations. We conclude with a brief discussion on how to examine more fully the emerging business-peace nexus as it expands throughout conflict zones and fragile developing states.
Our primary argument is that beyond recognising B4P's stated aim of extending private authority into peacebuilding, B4P is also an effort to extend public authority over MNC operations in volatile environments. This entails the development of a new position within liberal peace doctrines which, paraphrasing Ruggie (2003) , can be designated as 'taking embedded liberal peacebuilding global' -that is, advancing peace through the market but embedded in a novel, more diffused, global public architecture. In restructuring the global governance of MNCs, B4P is also thus complicit in a dislocation of the public -a relocation of the public governance of war and peace within and between states to a more diffuse global public architecture.
Ultimately, as Abrahamsen and Williams (2009: 6) argue, any investigation of the intersection of the global and the local in nexuses across the public/private divide will have to take the form of some kind of 'grounded theory', i.e. informing through analyses situated in concrete contexts. Thus, the final part of this article explores the local impact of business-peace interactions in conflictaffected and high-risk areas. If distinctions between the corporate and private spheres seem to be clear-cut, their utility to describe the plurality of forms of power that increasingly mark corporate presence in practice is limited. Moreover, this plurality is not novel but rather a contemporary manifestation of institutionalised local governance asymmetries. And, as both action and impact by businesses on peace and peacebuilding lag well behind high-level rhetoric, the underlying motivations behind this thrust are worthy of exploration.
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The emergence of the business-peace nexus To indicate how the discourse has shifted, even previously critical NGOs including
International Alert and to a lesser extent Global Witness now 'explore the potential of the private sector to contribute to peacebuilding' rather than outright rejecting private sector involvement in conflict-related issues (Ismail and Nusrat 2014: 1) . As a result, the private sector now engages extensively with the World Bank and INGOs in policy and practice; they, in turn, offer public-private partnerships to stimulate peaceful development through poverty reduction and socio-economic growth (Brainard et al. 2007; UNGC 2013b; Börzel and Risse 2005; Ford 2015 ).
Internally, many large Western-owned MNCs that operated in such areas vii adopted these new (largely non-binding) mechanisms to at least give the impression that they were sensitive to local issues, including extractive firms such as Chevron, Shell, Barick Gold, Rio Tinto and Statoil. The consumer popularisation of terms like 'conflict minerals' became broad societal triggers that went beyond individual sectors alone, and subcontracting and supply-chain examinations became more common investigative fodder. In response, many MNCs began to adopt new and more extensive corporate social responsibility platforms, including Creating Shared Value, corporate diplomacy and ethics, human rights frameworks, or industry-specific initiatives like the Extractive Industries
Transparency Initiative (Haski-Leventhal, 2014; Lenfant 2013, 2015; Oh and Oetzel 2016) .
However, often these initiatives were not housed in the operations departments of MNCs, but in their public relations wings. And these divisions did not tend to seek out improvements in the supply chain minutiae that might create unseen but real benefits for conflict-affected communities; instead, as we will illustrate below, they prioritised creating high-profile engagements with the very critics that had been clamouring for change: international NGOs and the United Nations (Miklian 2018) . In conflict zones, the promotion of peace and peacebuilding became a priority. MNCs provided funding for 'do gooder' initiatives, and INGOs and the United Nations provided direction and scope for many such initiatives, formally acting upon the notion that the private sector can indeed be a force for good if it is directed properly (Fort 2014; Miklian and Hoelscher 2017; Miklian and Bickel 2018) .
Critics of these tie-ups have expressed unease about the wisdom of engaging businesses as peace and development actors. Gardner (2016) explores how the use of 'partnerships' has allowed
Chevron to institute Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) programmes that imply mutual engagement but are often just as top-down and unresponsive to local needs as the projects that came before them. Shamir (2010) sees CSR as the manifestation of capitalism's ability to turn critique into new commercial and managerial assets, and Garsten (2015) sees the internationalised ideological components of CSR as representative of increased universalisation of MNC legitimacy in public sphere activities more generally. Critiques have even extended to the notion of 'development' itself, with arguments that today's working definition is too broad and it is too easy to incorporate projects that do not substantially improve the human condition (Ziai 2013 ).
Moore and Schmitz (2016: xxii) consider this a crisis for development and peacebuilding agents, 'which seeks to be all things to all people', especially when the language of sustainable development is used by corporations to positively pitch new projects to conflict-affected local communities. In the business community, 'sustainable development' often means in practice the policies and actions a firm takes to reduce energy footprints and become more neutral in local energy equations while maintaining growth (Aras and Crowther 2016) . Thus a firm can be both 'sustainable' and a 'national-level peacebuilder' while simultaneously contributing tacitly through tax payments and legitimacy through public-private partnerships to political calculations of violence, particularly by the state against vulnerable communities (Miklian 2017b) . These critiques are often paralleled in discussions with rank-and-file employees of INGOs and the UN itself about where and when business should be involved in peacebuilding. But the growing push from elite quarters of the practitioner and academic development community to have the private sector become more significantly involved in peacebuilding through SDG implementation has often sidelined such concerns (UNGC 2013a (UNGC , 2016 Ganson et al. 2016) .
This paradigm shift is infused with theoretical innovations which promote linking the private sector and peacebuilding. Inverting the popular theory that conflict, poverty and economic motives ('greed') are tightly interlinked (Collier 2007) , the World Bank now generally supports the argument that GDP influx is a crucial tool for stabilising fragile post-conflict societies, and 'a thriving, legal, private sector is essential to development and peace' (Peschka 2011: 1 (Banfield et al. 2003) . The recognition that the private sector can play a positive role if given the right incentives or support (Peschka 2011 ) dovetailed with increasing donor frustration at stagnant outcomes of traditional development aid delivery. This encouraged donors to consider new development approaches, including reconsidering the role of business in conflict, and reassessing the belief that profit and peace are best kept at arm's length.
Based on these developments, the UN now believes that it 'needs to increase this momentum.
The UN's Peacebuilding architecture has a key role to play for this to become more systematic and to scale up that engagement so that including business in peacebuilding becomes business as usual for the UN'. viii The UN Global Compact is the most outspoken driver of the business-peace nexus, as it envisions that local peace governance can be improved by bringing businesses into the UN's global peacebuilding architecture. The UNGC is structured to connect MNCs with civil society, with 101 local networks of civil society organisations from 140 countries. ix The UNGC's idea was that large
Western multinationals rely on reputations, and activist groups and international media can scrutinise their activities and bring them up to par.
x Launched in 2013, Business for Peace is a crown on the business-peace nexus, at once advancing the most radical version of this agenda as well as lending it the UN brand. Conceived as a 'leadership platform which will expand and deepen private sector action in support of peace', it aims to 'mobilise high-level corporate leadership to advance peaceful development through actions at the global and local levels in order to galvanize progress and scale up positive impacts' (UNGC 2013a). Today, 130 firms from 37 countries take part in the B4P platform alongside dozens of local and regional B4P networks, in addition to the 15,000 firms that are part of the broader Compact. xi As signatories to B4P, companies like Talisman Oil, Barrick Gold and G4S -firms with documented negative impacts in conflict-affected areas -are now at the forefront of the business-peace nexus.
B4P and corporate global governance: reassembling the public and private
Exemplifying the unsettling of this convention, corporate participation in peace is broadly accepted by the international community in a way that would have been inconceivable twenty years ago. To understand where the significance of the B4P initiative resides, we must contextualise it within deeper interconnections between the public and private in global governance. This section contextualises the growth of the business-peace nexus within our understandings of the changing role of corporate actors in IR through B4P, highlighting how such debates are reframing the reconfiguration of 'public' and 'private', and the advantages and limitations of this shift in practice.
It is important to note that B4P does not constitute a fully fleshed strategy to send a MNC into a particular country in order to create peace. Instead, like the post-Cold War liberal peacebuilding project before it (Richmond 2006; Miklian 2014 ), B4P represents a new normative ideal for corporate intervention in a sphere of global governance that is as contested as it is in flux (Pegram and Acuto 13 2015) . Most importantly, it reassembles the foundational divide between the public and the private, which delimits which actors can participate in and accrue benefits from different spheres of activities (Best and Gheciu 2014) . The public/private divide is considered foundational in IR as a historically shaped tool to limit the exercise of legitimate violence to public authorities -a form of sovereignty only practically achieved to some extent, and only in some parts of the world, towards the end of the 19 th century and now again under question (Ruggie 1993: 151; Thomson 1995) .
Contemporary business-peace discussions aspire to replace the 'race to the bottom' that was associated with the spread of MNCs in the 1990s with a 'race to the top' in terms of positive corporate contributions. The UN and other B4P-affiliated organisations aim to contribute by creating a broad 'epistemic community' between business and peacebuilding actors, where development organisations and MNCs operate in a single discursive field to develop converging notions of 'conflict sensitivity'
and of the importance of corporate contributions in volatile environments (UNGC 2013b; Dahan et al. 2006; Miklian and Rettberg 2017) . By extension, we argue that B4P's significance resides in reframing the role of corporations in global governance frameworks. While the UN system before generally shunned businesses or approached them as actors that needed increased guidance to 'do no harm' (Ford 2015: 40) , B4P now heralds them as potential peacemakers. B4P thus represents a concrete rapprochement between business and the UN, after decades of hostilities (Thérien and Pouliot 2006) . But B4P also provides new inputs into fundamental IR controversies over what kind of agency private actors should have in the international system today. The debate has tended to take a zero-sum form -with scholars like those noted above either critical or supportive of a bigger corporate role in the business-peace nexus -but we argue that while B4P heralds a definitive movement towards more private 'rowing' in matters related to peace, this at the same time entails an expansion of the public 'steering' of corporate activities in conflict-affected zones.
B4P intervenes in contemporary debates on the crucial question of whether a 'corporation' is exclusively an economic actor or also has other, political roles (Abrahamsen and Williams 2014; Ford 2015; Welker 2014) . In order to be attractive to corporations, B4P needs to appeal to the corporate self-image of doing good by doing well. xii This echoes liberal peace theories that corporate activities such as growing GDP and expanding markets are the key drivers of peace (Oetzel et al. 2010; Oetzel and Miklian 2017 (Hönke 2014 ). The implication is that instead of business activities creating peaceful development, B4P may become a mechanism to embolden MNCs by defusing criticism of corporate expansion into conflict zones (Banerjee 2008) . Underpinning this critique is a broad academic engagement mapping the contradictions inherent in contemporary neoliberal rule (Mansfield 2004) . While neoliberal policies argue against government interventions that might restrain a free market, in practice vast global governance structures are put in place to facilitate the expansion of markets (Braithwaite 2005) . More importantly, this liberal order has profoundly illiberal effects on the ground (Bachmann et al. 2015) , something we return to below.
B4P also reframes our notions of the amalgamation called 'the corporation' as a political actor, recognising the de facto role that corporations play in that corner of the public sphere that is assumed to be the preserve of states. By expanding the UN's visible hand to questions of corporate peace contributions, B4P is part of a broader resurgence of the public in global governance (Best and Gheciu 2014) . Borrowing an argument from John Ruggie, in reframing corporations as peace actors B4P then paradoxically also circumscribes private authority by folding it into a more inclusive global public realm (Ruggie 2004) . While critics of MNCs in conflict zones rightly point out that MNCs can be human rights violators (Ratner 2001) , the novelty and promise of corporate governance initiatives like B4P is that they hold the potential to subvert the long-standing premise of the international system that only states can be held accountable for corporate impact in conflict zones (Muchlinski 2001 ).
B4P's effect on the business-peace nexus resides in the fact that it extends a form of governance previously applied in Western development partnerships with African states, in which the 'partner' -be it an African state or a MNC -is governed through self-adopted commitments. Rather than working through imposition, the strength of such liberal mechanisms resides in the self-disciplinary effect of the promise of incorporation of MNCs into the UN fold (Abrahamsen 2004) . By promoting the identity of MNCs as peace actors, B4P's power resides in influencing the interests that firms operating in conflict zones come to hold. It is premised on a branch of liberal peace theory that emphasises the role that liberal institutions can bring for peace rather than working through the agency of markets (Ruggie 2003) . It holds that transnational institutions and regimes can overcome the collective action problems and transaction costs that lead to conflict by promoting interdependence, and that the externalities of unrestrained free markets can be curbed by embedding them within an institutional architecture. With John Ruggie as a principal architect behind the UN agency that set up B4P, this version of liberal peace theory directly informs the contemporary B4P agenda.
If B4P could be portrayed as a mere discursive blind for the continuation of human rights abuses under neoliberal hegemony, xv such criticism disregards the implications that such a discursive or representational shift at the transnational level could have for mechanisms of accountability. Situating corporations as peace actors with roles in the public sphere tilts the balance of power in favour of outside stakeholder control over corporate governance vis-à-vis insider stakeholders (Backer 2006 In this way, B4P portends more than a reframing of corporations as significant in the public realm; it is a reconfiguration of what we understand to be the public realm itself, raising the question of whether B4P is not more important for its effects on the UN than for corporations or peace in volatile environments. In recognising corporations as peacebuilders via B4P, the UN risks eroding the very principles it was meant to enshrine -namely, a commitment to contain agency in matters of war and peace to a limited forum composed principally of great power states. Global politics is not only about substantive questions of war and peace, but also about defining what kind of actors are considered legitimate in these theatres. For the UN, this includes the global peace architecture that it was created to defend. Yet, B4P also represents a more nuanced reassembly of the public/private divide in ways that give rise to complex articulations of global governance in which agency is distributed across a nexus that challenges Manichean distinctions between the public and the private (Owens 2008) . To unearth how such global configurations of power are equally contingent on a local operational presence, we now turn to the manifestation of the business-peace nexus in the concrete setting of one of the most convoluted cases, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).
The business-peace nexus in the DRC
In this section, we show that while MNCs are framed as 'top down' peace actors through B4P, this move coexists with the increasing corporate role of exacerbating imbalanced local access to security and justice in high-risk and conflict-affected environments. MNCs are increasingly involved in the local delivery and maintenance of UN peacebuilding efforts, affecting not only their own operational equations but also subverting the local articulation of UN-led peacebuilding efforts. To articulate this aspect of the business-peace nexus, we adapt the term 'asymmetrical governance' xvii to explain how the amalgamation of global and national, public and private into the operational presence of corporations further skews the balance of power in their encounters with local populations. The notion of asymmetrical governance has two aspects. Mirroring how Anna Tsing has characterised today's global supply chains as exploiting the gap between formal corporate enterprise and more varied economic forms which predominate in less-developed countries, it first highlights the fact that the global chains through which multinational corporations and peacekeeping missions connect to volatile environments have a tendency to channel benefits upwards while discharging the externalities of conflict onto those downstream. Second, it also points to the discrepancies in power positions which structure the local manifestation of the business-peace nexus of MNCs in such areas, which can be characterised as a 'global assemblage' (Abrahamsen and Williams 2011) -the clustering of a network of actors around MNC and UN operational sites, leading to hybrids of governance and security that defy the local/global, public/private and security/commercial divides that usually structure categorisations in IR. In the following, we will illustrate these two aspects of asymmetrical governance in the business-peace nexus by zooming in on two B4P signatories in Congo: the global private security company G4S and the electronics company LG.
We situate these individual examples into the broader business-peace nexus in Congo. The DRC is a representative, if complex, case. It is home to a number of intractable and interlocking conflicts, involving tensions with neighbouring countries as well as nearly a hundred of armed groups.
It also hosts the longest-standing and costliest UN peacekeeping mission in the world, costing around $1 billion per year since 1999. The private sector is profoundly entangled within the official UN-led peacebuilding network. For one, the UN outsources large parts of the immense supply chain required to sustain the world's largest peacekeeping mission to dedicated logistics suppliers such as the Bolloré Group, which controls a large share of the African logistics market. The UN is also the largest single consumer of private security services in the DRC, hiring over 2,000 private security guards to secure its peacebuilding infrastructures (Schouten 2014: 130) . Second, over the past few years extractives have been forced to become a 'partner' in UN-led efforts to address the 'conflict mineral' conundrum which is understood as a root cause in the DRC conflict, by complying with UN-driven mineral certification schemes. Finally, beyond accepting the private sector as a de facto element of peacebuilding, the UN also labours actively to attract private sector investment in fragile and conflict- NGOs associated with stabilisation efforts in the DRC vie with the extractives sector as the private security sector's largest source of income. In the eastern DRC humanitarian hub of Goma, around 80% of the city's 5,000 private security guards are hired by INGOs or other international actors. xviii Since private security at compound gates is the first and often the only thing that Congolese see of the 'international community', private security is the local public face of the UN system (Schouten 2011: 71) . As international actors across the business-peace nexus deploy private security companies for their operations in the DRC, we can point to the broader convergence of how multinational corporations and aid organisations secure their operations 'abroad'. One marked effect of the evolving business-peace nexus in the DRC is that the local operations of MNC and the UN look increasingly alike, as they deploy the same mix of private security and bunkerisation to enclave their compounds from their surroundings (ibid.). As Avant and Haufler (2012: 255-56) put it, 'Although we agree that their missions and motivations are distinct, we are struck by intriguing similarities in their trajectories over the past 20 years in their overseas operations'. This is further illuminated through the example of the global private security giant G4S, one B4P signatory currently operating in the DRC. G4S is a controversial firm globally for actions like its services to Israel's occupation of the Palestine Territories and abuses in prisons it manages, but it promotes its B4P associations to profile itself as committed to peace. 'As a socially responsible 20 company,' their website reads, 'G4S reinforces its commitment to Business for Peace through working alongside governments and non-governmental organisations in high-risk environments to support humanitarian, stabilisation and economic reconstruction efforts.' xix Holding around 20% of the market, G4S is a key vehicle through which transnational actors secure their local operations. As a private security company, its activities irrevocably influence the distribution of and access to a good usually associated with the 'public' (security) which is highly contested and privatised in the DRC.
In the DRC, public authority is heterogeneous and widely considered part and parcel of conflict dynamics, hosting 'bubbles of public authority' that manifest themselves around the operational infrastructures of MNCs. In such enclaves, the exercise of public authority is geared towards selectively upholding a rule of law that is not enforced outside such pockets (Schouten 2017: 146) .
This means that when local citizens are confronted with a corporation, they see both state power and corporate activity through the unified concentration of weapons and profits, repression and opportunity. Public authority is folded into the hierarchy of G4S's clients via DRC police who are for hire and as a rule accompany private security services to corporate or peacebuilding clients. By folding public security agents into the G4S hierarchy, the company and its clients have a profound negative impact on security provision in Congo by supporting fortified expat enclaves that emphasise mistrust and insecurity (Duffield 2010) . While public security agents operating under privatised hierarchies tend to respect the rule of law (and receive regular pay), their 'public' counterparts are the key source of human rights abuses in Congo, forming a quantitatively larger source of insecurity for the population than the many rebel movements do. As a result, the contrast is thus rather between disproportionally securitised international spaces on the one hand and criminalised public space on the other (Schouten 2016; Reyntjens 2005) .
The activities of both extractive and private security actors in the DRC show how merging business and multilateral institutions through the business-peace nexus makes it hard for local communities to differentiate who they are dealing with, rendering security, government and the international community as all part of one impenetrable and unaccountable conglomeration (Schouten 21 2017: 157) . While such tie-ups allowed G4S to articulate its peace contributions, they also abolished the supposed independence of multilateral institutions like the UN as they repeatedly and visibly partner with corporations in contexts where corporate engagement itself is not neutral. It raises the crucial question of whether or not B4P adds to corporate leverage by not only endorsing MNC presence in zones of contested rule, but also by siding with and promoting business as a peace actor to local communities -implicitly framing detractors of the political order driven by corporate operations as challengers of the liberal peace. Since such practices are replicated across volatile environments worldwide (Abrahamsen and Williams 2011) , the unintended consequences of expanding the business-peace nexus to deliver inclusive development to the world's most fragile societies may vastly outweigh the short-term benefits. In unpacking private security as a form of authority that MNCs draw upon to structure and secure their operational presence, the notion of asymmetrical governance at once challenges the idea that corporate activities thrive without political intervention -for they often seem to require this accompanying assemblage of public authority in order to be able to operate -and points towards the unequal distribution of public authority between corporate actors and populations affected by their operations.
As a second case, at the top of the global mineral supply chain we find the B4P signatory LG Electronics, the South Korean technology giant best known for its mobile phones.
LG followed the many publicly listed companies that use the minerals, who have been obliged since 2012 to declare to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) whether or not they come from the affected region and, if so, whether or not they are 'conflict-free' under the Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform and Costumer Protection Act -itself an effort which emerged out of pressure from the UN, OECD and non-governmental organisations to delink mineral extraction from armed group financing in the DRC. xx The technology that LG produces relies heavily on exactly the kind of minerals -tantalum, gold, tin -that come from Congo's mines, a portion of which is controlled by armed groups. Not obliged to do so because it is not publicly listed in the US, LG nevertheless aims to use its sway over mineral supply chains to impact positively on conflict in the DRC. Far upstream a complicated global layered cake of subcontractors, suppliers and affiliates, LG identified the downstream level of smelters -where raw ores get transformed into untraceable but quality-controlled industry materials -as the 'choke point' to responsible sourcing. As LG is not directly in business with smelters, it then told its suppliers to identify smelters and to encourage them to join a Conflict-Free Smelter certification scheme, adding that 'When there is a sufficient number of certified, conflict-free smelters/refiners, LG will require all its suppliers to source their minerals from these smelters' (UNGC 2013b: 38) .
LG admits, however, that 'many suppliers were difficult to contact and answer
LG's survey' and that it was furthermore 'difficult' to 'convince smelters and refiners to join the Conflict-Free Smelter programme'.
LG concluded that it gained 'considerable knowledge' of its supply chain while finding out that it had 'little leverage ' (ibid.: 40) .
LG is no isolated case. The Government Accountability Office, in its 2017 annual review of the SEC Conflict Mineral Rule, concluded that 'Almost all of the companies that reported conducting due diligence in 2016 reported that they could not determine whether the conflict minerals financed or benefited armed groups, as in ' (GAO 2017 . Contacted for an interview, a smelter who wishes to remain anonymous for commenting on sensitive topics, commented that they want us to bear the brunt of very expensive certification which imperils our business model, especially since we're one of the few sourcing from Congo. And actually, behind all the public talk of commitments and change, what they most want is for the flow of cheap minerals to go on unabated -they're not willing to pay higher prices for responsibly sourced minerals. capitalism ' (2016: 62) , characteristic of today's global supply chains is that they actually thrive by reaping the profit margins over sourcing from unregulated, stubbornly opaque, and 'un-capitalist'
forms of supply such as those practiced downstream in Congo's mineral sector. These chains are governed asymmetrically: pressure to adapt, be accountable, and pay the price to conform is pushed upstream while profits accrue downstream. While it might be asked what the extractives and private security sectors in the DRC can tell us about the workings of B4P more broadly, the point here is exactly that these are often exactly the only MNC operating in the contexts which would arguably benefit most from corporate contributions to peace.
Building meaning within the business-peace nexus
Explorations of the nexus between business and peace often single out either its negative or positive aspects, focusing on corporate misdoings or governance innovations. In this article, we have tried to present a more nuanced picture of the business-peace nexus by exploring the multiple and contradictory implications of the emergence of a new paradigm, Business for Peace. Corporations have had local impact dating back to their colonial origins, but B4P represents the most systematic attempt thus far to elevate corporate participation explicitly within the domain and approval of multilateral institutions. We have argued that B4P presents an innovation of the association between corporations and peacebuilding, one that extends public authority over corporate conduct in conflict zones by reframing corporations as peace actors. While the UN's adoption of B4P contains the promise to extend public authority over corporate activities in conflict zones, B4P also redefines peace as a field beyond the domain of states and their IGO proxies. This transition risks blurring the lines of authority and accountability, and undermines the restriction of participants in matters of peace and war that the UN was founded to defend. The public/private divide that is constitutive in IR thus risks being dismantled by the very multilateral institutions tasked to defend it, but our analytical frameworks to address these externalities lag. Instead of siding either with or against corporations as peacebuilders, we argue for a grounded approach to study the composite entanglements that make up the fabric of the business-peace nexus as it today manifests itself across the global South.
Based on the case of the DRC, we illustrated how rather than signifying either an expansion of private authority or a reconfiguration of the public realm, B4P heralds a new hybrid form of global governance in conflict areas that inserts MNCs as peacebuilders. However, B4P may lead to a 'peace' that is highly uneven and contested locally, especially if the criteria are set in multi-stakeholder meetings in the global North. This echoes a lesson not learned (or at least not applied) from the debates over the 'security-development' nexus. As seen in the DRC, local manifestations of contemporary corporate-driven business-peace action often prove to be a locus of asymmetrical governance, at times complicit in unaccountable violence (Miklian and Schouten 2013; Miklian 2017a This article advanced an analytical approach to capture these blurred lines, as a framework premised on the public/private divide is of insufficient utility to capture the expanding footprints of corporate entanglement within peace and conflict equations. While recognising that upholding the public-private divide may be viewed as a laudable normative aspiration to organise violence in an accountable way, any real engagement with the predicament of those in conflict-affected societies needs to start from the grounded recognition of how agency is allocated and redistributed across the business-peace nexus. Future research on the business-peace nexus can draw major value from the country case, corporate case, and institutional levels of analysis to further tease out the theoretical implications of this emerging paradigm, and we welcome a significant expansion of such in IR, development studies, business ethics, and area studies, amongst other relevant fields.
interface between corporate and peacebuilding actors among the many associations that make up the tangled web of peacekeeping worlds. The notion of business and peace forming a nexus was first coined -but not developed further -in Ford (2015: 21 x Source: interviews at UN B4P inaugural meeting, Istanbul 2014. Also see Gilboa et al. (2016) .
xi The yawning gap between the number of signatories in the UNGC and B4P may be seen as a result of the B4P platform's overlap with the UNGC (and company belief that UNGC participation is enough for peace and development), or there may be larger structural risk issues that influence such choices. The topic is unfortunately beyond the scope of this paper but future empirical research on firm choices to participate in such ventures may prove insightful. Thanks to anonymous reviewer for this point.
xii Miklian (2018) ; also see Carroll (2015) . Oslo. He conducts mixed-methods research in several countries of Asia, Latin America and Africa using rigorous qualitative analysis and systematic micro-level studies, publishing extensively on various aspects of peacebuilding and development, with a focus on business and peace in particular.
